Abstract Following the Winner's Curse and the Optimizer's Curse, this paper introduces the Satisficer's Curse. The Winner's Curse requires competition between agents in an auction for, usually, a common-value item; the recently named Optimizer's Curse is a systematic overvaluation when the decision maker is choosing the highest valued prospect of a set of uncertain future outcomes. The Satisficer's Curse is a systematic overvaluation that occurs when any uncertain prospect is chosen because its estimate exceeds a positive threshold. It is the most general version of the three curses, all of which can be seen as statistical artefacts.
Introduction
"The good news is you've won the bidding; the bad news is you're paying too much." This encapsulates the Winner's Curse, first formalized forty years ago. More recently, the Optimizer's Curse has shown that competitive bidding is not required to generalize similar ex-post disappointment. Rather, merely choosing the best of a set of uncertain prospects will result in disappointment, on average. In this paper, we argue that optimizing is not necessary either: simply accepting a prospect if its performance has exceeded some hurdle will also result in ex-post disappointment as subsequent performance does not reflect the prior hurdle jumping, on average. We call this the Satisficer's Curse. For managers this means that any selection process to choose uncertain Robert E. Marks Economics, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Tel.: +61-2-99319271 Fax: +61-2-99319199 E-mail: bobm@agsm.edu.au prospects -investments, employees, contractors, technologies -that relies on past performance exceeding some threshold will likely result in ex-post disappointment for the decision-maker, as on average the chosen prospect will not repeat the prior performance, absent an upward trend. All three curses are statistical artefacts caused by their selection techniques, with no psychological dimensions. There is no way to avoid the Satisficer's Curse, but recognition of the phenomenon will reduce expectations.
Thirty-eight years ago a trio of oil men (Capen et al. 1970 ) observed and named the phenomenon of the Winner's Curse in auctions, later epitomized by the saying, "The good news is you won; the bad news is you paid too much". Their point-estimate model of selection bias was generalized by Harrison and March (1984) , who assumed Gaussian distributions in their modeling, and further generalized by Smith and Winkler (2006) , who argued that there was no need for the explicit competition of the auction mechanism, and who coined the phrase, the "Optimizer's Curse," to argue that any decision that chooses the best prospect from a set of possibilities will fall heir to "post-decision" disappointment, on average.
The first paper to draw attention to the post-decision disappointment associated with internal capital investment decisions was Brown (1974) , but Harrison and March (1984, p.27 ) also noted that when a decision-maker was choosing the best option among a predetermined number of alternatives, or when the alternatives were considered sequentially until one was identified as satisfying some predetermined aspiration level or hurdle, then post-decision disappointment would occur, on average. Compte (2004, p.9 ) also commented that selection bias would occur when choosing the best from a set of alternatives, without any recourse to psychological motivation (Camerer and Lovallo 1999 , Lovallo and Kahnemann 2003 , Tiwana et al. 2007 ). See Statman and Tyebjee (1985) and van den Steen (2004) for surveys of evaluation biases and their psychological and other foundations.
Section 2 presents a formal model of the Satisficer's Curse and proves the key theorem of the paper. Section 3 applies this to a firm's selection of a project to satisfy a minimum threshold of expected performance. Section 4 extends the proof to Smith & Winkler's Optimizer's Curse. Section 5 discusses our findings; we discuss the origins of decision-making biases, and ask whether one can escape the Satisficer's Curse, once identified.
The Formal Model
Choosing prospect i when its predicted value exceeds a threshold is "satisficing."
1 That is, the predicted value is "good enough" to choose or accept, rather than being the best, or optimized. Previous work by Smith and Winkler (2006) demonstrated that choosing the optimal prospect would result in disappointment, on average. They called this the "Optimizer's Curse." Here we generalize their findings, with the "Satisficer's Curse." Let S i be the expected difference between the predicted valueŶ i and the ex-post realized value v i of an uncertain future prospect i, conditional on the predicted value exceeding a positive threshold p > 0. We write this as
where the predicted valueŶ i of prospect i is assumed to be the sum of the true value µ i and an error i :Ŷ
Theorem 1 Absent a conditional Bayesian expectation of value, S i will be strictly positive.
Before proceeding to prove this, we need some further scaffolding. In a Bayesian world, the joint distribution over the ex-post realized value v i and the predicted valueŶ i would be known. This would allow computation of the conditional Bayesian expectation of value, given a specific ex-post realization v i of the value estimate V i :
Assumption 1 Decision makers assume thatŶ i = V i , that is, that the predicted value equals the estimated value. This is equivalent to assuming (perhaps implicitly) that E[Ŷ i ] = µ i , which implies ignoring the error i .
, that is, unconditional errors cancel. We are, however, concerned with conditional expectations: the expected prediction error (Ŷ i − v i ) conditional onŶ i > p > 0, the predicted value exceeding the positive threshold.
If Theorem 1 is correct, then for any ex-post value realization v i , high realizations of the predicted valueŶ i coincide with high realizations of the error term i , and hence coincide with over-valuation. That is, the expected difference between the predicted and realized values, given that the predicted value exceeds a positive threshold, is positive.
Definition 1 Prospect i exhibits the Satisficer's Curse when
Definition 2 Define the decision-maker's optimism H i as the difference between the predicted valueŶ i and the conditional Bayesian predicted value
It follows that 3 ) Assumption 1 implies thatŶ i = V i , so the event {Ŷ i > p > 0}, that is, the event that the predicted value exceeds a positive threshold, is equivalent to the event { i > Z i }, the error i exceeds a value Z i , defined as the difference between the positive threshold p and the true value µ i :
Then, taking expectations of both sides of Eq. (4), the expected optimism, given that the predicted value exceeds the positive threshold, is given by
But, by construction E( i ) = 0, and i is independent of values µ i for any realization z i ∈ Z i that falls within the support of i (which is unbounded if the p.d.f. g i generating the error i is Gaussian).
, the supports of i and Z i must overlap. This follows because each support is an interval, and because i and Z i both admit of a density that is everywhere positive in its support, by definition.
and Theorem 1 is proved.
We can generalize this. If the predicted valueŶ i is based on past observations, then it is not sufficient for future desired performance (or even future satisfactory performance) that an observed event has occurred in which the realized value v i exceeded the threshold p, the positive hurdle. In general, a satisficing decision-maker will be disappointed in future: the Satisficer's Curse.
It is understood that setting performance hurdles does not guarantee better performance in the future, unless there is trending improvement of performance, so that the underlying stochastic process has a rising true value µ (t) . But the Satisficer's Curse is saying that, in general, future performance of a stationary stochastic process will not attain the positive threshold, at least in expected terms.
A Model of Project Selection
Assume n independent projects available for internal investment by a company, each of which has an independent value µ i , described by a p.d.f. f i , and an error term i , described by a p.d.f. g i . The estimate V i of the ith project's value is the sum of the true value µ i and the error term i :
The error terms are assumed independent across projects, and are unbiased: 
Here, in contrast, we assume that the firm is aware that values µ i are distributed independently, but that, conditional on V i , the firm forms an erroneous predictionŶ i of the value µ i . (ThusŶ i = Y * i necessarily. This could also be explained by use of an erroneous conditional distribution of value µ i given estimate V i ; other possible reasons are discussed in Section 5.1 below.) Assumption 1 above states that the predicted valueŶ i is given by the estimated value V i . This assumption models the polar case in which the firm believes that the estimate V i has a higher predictive content than it really has, by ignoring the error term in Equation (8) . This does not imply thatŶ i is greater than Y * i , only that the firm ignores the error in estimation, and underestimates the error in the realization x i of µ i . To summarize: For some projects the firm will be too optimistic about the value, meaning that:Ŷ i > Y * i (v i ), and for other projects the firm will be too pessimistic:Ŷ i < Y * i (v i ).
The Optimizer's Curse
In this section, we extend our framework to prove the existence of Smith and W inkler's (2006) optimizer's curse. We denote the difference between the actual prediction and the conditional Bayesian prediction Y * i (v i ) from Equation (3) by the optimism H i associated with project i: (4) . Note that under Assumption 1, by assumption E(V i ) = E(µ i ), the estimate V i is an unbiased estimate of value µ i , so that on average there is no optimism associated with any project i, and the prediction errors cancel: E(H i ) = 0. Let ∆ i denote the expected difference between predicted and realized values, conditional on being chosen, that is:
Definition 3 Project i exhibits the Optimizer's Curse when ∆ i > 0.
In other words, the Optimizer's Curse refers to situations in which the value of the chosen project was overestimated. Following Compte (2004) , note that ∆ i can be rewritten as:
by construction. When we consider competing bidders in an auction, in the limiting case of a single bidder (who is thus certain to win), the prediction errors cancel, and the bidder does not suffer the Winner's Curse on average. But in the case of a firm choosing a single project from a set, with possibly erroneous predictions of the values of each, almost always the firm will suffer the Optimizer's Curse, even though each prediction is an unbiased estimate of that project's value. Only if there were a single project to choose from would the firm not experience the Optimizer's Curse on average.
How is this so? The act of choosing the project with the highest predicted (net) value induces a selection bias in favor of projects with (overly) optimistic value predictions.
Under what circumstances would such a firm not suffer a once-off occurrence of post-decision disappointment? When both of the following conditions are met: when project k is chosen, becauseŶ k >Ŷ i for all i = k, orŶ k > max i =kŶi , and when the highest value predictionŶ k (of project k) is less than the realization v k , so that
Of course, that a single occurrence is profitable does not preclude the Optimizer's Curse from occurring over several repetitions: given the stochastic nature of the net returns, it is the expectation of these returns that indicates the existence of the Optimizer's Curse, or not.
Theorem 2 WithŶ i = V i (Assumption 1), if 0 < Pr{i wins} < 1, then ∆ i > 0, that is, if the decision maker uses the naive forecast (Assumption 1), and the project could be chosen (its choice is neither certain nor impossible), then the project exhibits the Optimizer's Curse. Theorem 2 will follow from Theorem 1 because project i is only chosen (wins) in events where its predicted value is equal to or greater thanp = max j =iŶj , the highest prediction across other projects.
Proof Proof of Theorem 2. (After Compte (2004), Proposition 1.) Definē
We have
given that i is preferred to all others. Since 0 < Pr{i is chosen} < 1, the support ofp andŶ i must overlap, for the same reason as the proof of Theorem 1 above. Thus, from Theorem 1, the result follows:
and Theorem 2 is proved (under Assumption 1): the chosen project exhibits the Optimizer's Curse.
Discussion
The Satisficer's Curse is similar to the Peter Principle (when no competition for promotion or tenure exists, just a performance hurdle), although Lazear (2004) points out that those decisions are special cases in the estimates (our V i ) are based on past performance alone. There is no such restriction on how our estimates are derived; indeed, for many proposals there will be no past performance to observe. Van der Steen (2004) argues in effect that overly attractive predictions may stem from, first, estimation errors, as discussed above, and, second, from the range of attractivenesses (i.e. diversity across projects).
Compte (2004) notes that our Theorem 2 is connected to Capen et al.'s (1971) insight, and relies on neither point estimates, nor values being common or interdependent. Its proof does not rely on Gaussian distributions, either. He further notes that Theorem 2 illustrates how competition induces a selection bias in favor of overly attractive projects. Theorem 1 illustrates that a similar selection bias may occur without competition, when a project is undertaken if it exceeds some positive hurdle p. If a project i is chosen whenever it looks attractive (whenever its NPV is greater than some positive threshold p), that is, whenever (Ŷ i − p) is positive, then the higher the error term, the more likely the project is to be undertaken, and, as a result, conditional on accepting the contract, project i is overly attractive.
A corollary of Theorem 2 is that the same combination of factors (viz. estimation errors and choice among various alternative projects) generates overattractiveness (relative to true prospects). Selecting the project which appears to have the highest value (estimate) to the firm is equivalent to choosing the agent with the highest estimate of the item being sold in an auction. Theorem 2 says that whichever projects the firm ends up selecting (optimally) will turn out to have been valued optimistically, on average.
Will competition among firms reduce the Satisficer's Curse? As Massey and Thaler (2006) note, the Winner's Curse can persist in competitive markets because there are limits to arbitrage: the winners either go broke or learn; wiser heads must watch from the sidelines and hope for the former. "Since there is no way to sell the oil leases short, the smart money cannot actively drive the 8 prices down." Since the Satisficer's Curse does not assume any interaction between firms, competition plays no direct role here. 
where λ ∈ [0,1). That is, the firm realizes that estimation error is possible but downplays the magnitude of its own errors by a factor λ. The factor λ can be interpreted as a measure of "model risk," a major concern in financial risk management (Kato and Yoshiba 2000) . 5 The firm's predictionŶ i of the value µ i is:
where the superscript λ means that the expectation is taken assuming a joint distribution over V i and µ i is characterized by Equation (14) . We have already shown that (Theorem 2) a project chosen under the naive Assumption 1 will exhibit the Optimizer's Curse (in its expected sense), and a moment's thought about Equation (14) shows that only if the full error term i is acknowledged (λ = 1) doesŶ i = Y * i ; for any λ less than 1 Theorem 2 still holds.
6 Indeed, it is easily shown that ∆ i is decreasing in λ.
Learning to Avoid the Satisficer's Curse?
What about learning? Discussing sealed-bid tenders to sell in procurement auctions, Compte (2004) proposed a model in which bidders learn to set a mark-up on their cost estimates to reduce the risk of suffering the Winner's Curse, and argued that this leads to increased cautiousness in bidding, whether with private or common values.
In the case we consider of a firm choosing a prospect from a range of prospects, what is the decision-maker to learn? Should he or she ignore the ranking by predicted value because of the error terms i ? To do so would be to throw information away. Raising any return hurdlep that some projects are predicted to exceed will not obviate the Satisficer's Curse (from Theorem 1) so long as the error term is ignored (λ = 0) or discounted (λ ∈ [0,1)).
If the hurdle is an institutional threshold, then an understanding of the Satisficer's Curse should result in the institution learning to put procedures in place to reduce the prospect of performance reverting to the mean in future.
For example, accreditation (of a business school to the AACSB, for instance) should be followed by the school using the accreditation inspection process to institutionalize assurance procedures for maintaining or even improving future performance, lest entropy increase after the hurdle has been surpassed and accreditation achieved, leading to consequent withdrawal of accreditation.
If such learning is for whatever reason not available to the decision makers or those who benefit from jumping the hurdle, then acknowledgment of the Satisficer's Curse should qualify expectations that future performance will reflect past estimates; on average it will not.
